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THE EFFECTS OF TUCKER ON THE "FRUITS" OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED STATEMENTS
HE PRESENT MAJORITY OF SUPREME COURT JUsTICEs rejects a broad
application of the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation
of the constitutional safeguards laid down by the Warren Court in Mi-
randa v. Arizona.' Since 1971, the Court has substantially modified
the once seemingly inviolable principle that "no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used"2 against a defendant unless the
interrogation is preceded by adequate warnings and a subsequent waiver
of the right to silence. Illegally obtained statements which bear directly
on the guilt of the defendant are now admissible at trial for impeach-
ment purposes notwithstanding that the Miranda warnings were defec-
tive3 or that the statements were elicited after the defendant had re-
quested an attorney.4 The only requirement necessary for such admissi-
bility is that the statements be made voluntarily. 5
Although the Court has been careful to point out that illegally ob-
tained statements are not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief,
Michigan v. Tucker6 has done much to erode even that principle. In
Tucker, the Court found admissible the testimony of a witness whose
identity was learned solely on the basis of a statement obtained from the
defendant in violation of the guidelines set forth in Miranda. Despite
the Court's statement that it was significant that the interrogation pre-
ceded Miranda,7 and notwithstanding its reiteration of the principle that
the defendant's statements would not have been admissible in the prose-
cution's case in chief, the relative importance of Tucker to post-Miranda
fifth amendment safeguards should not be underestimated. This com-
ment will analyze the Tucker opinion and suggest that the Court's un-
precedented treatment of the constitutional issues surrounding the Mi-
randa warnings implies that Tucker is a harbinger of things to come.
I. THE CASE
The facts of Tucker provided an ideal setting for an opinion contain-
ing much broader language than was necessary to reverse the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. A 43-year-old woman was found by a co-worker
raped and badly beaten. The co-worker had observed a dog on the vic-
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 479.
3 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Harris was not informed of his right to ap-
pointed counsel.
4 Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
The Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971), found that statements
"voluntarily" made are admissible to impeach "provided of course that the trust-
worthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards." This language was repeated in
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
6 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
7 Id. at 447.
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tim's premises and since he knew she did not own one, he became
suspicious. After seeing the dog again, he informed the police who fol-
lowed the animal to the defendant's residence. The defendant was ar-
rested and given Miranda warnings with the exception of the warning
that he had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one. 8
The defendant declined counsel and was interrogated by the police. He
stated that he had been with Robert Henderson at the time of the rape,
an alibi which proved to be his undoing.9 When questioned, Henderson
told the police he had indeed seen Tucker on the night of the crime, but
that Tucker had left early. He also stated that he again saw the defen-
dant on the following day and had observed some scratches on his face.
Henderson told the officers that Tucker stated that he had gotten them
from "some woman lived [sic] the next block over."'10 Henderson sub-
sequently testified for the prosecution and Tucker was convicted. After
unsuccessful appeals to the Court of Appeals" and the Supreme Court of
Michigan, 12 he applied for a writ of habeas corpus which was granted
by the district court' 3 and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
This is a minimum requirement as proferred by the Court in Miranda:
Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a
lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to
counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the in-
digent - the person most often subjected to interrogation - the knowledge that
he too has a right to have counsel present.
384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966). The Court in Tucker did not discuss the importance of this
warning relative to the other Miranda warnings, nor did they confront the equal pro-
tection claim that might be argued in its absence.
9 Despite the fact that defendant's alibi directly led to an important state witness, the
Court declined to interpret this as, in effect, defendant "accusing" himself:
[T]he respondent did not accuse himself. The evidence which the prosecu-
tion successfully sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by respon-
dent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by respondent, but rather the
testimony of a third person who was subjected to no custodial pressures.
417 U.S. at 449.
This analytical approach begs the question, since any statements made by the de-
fendant which were useful to the police and prosecutor in gathering evidence against
the defendant should be conisidered within the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination. The Miranda decision clearly warrants this conclusion:
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish de-
grees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction
may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be
merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it
would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his
testimony at trial . . . . In Escobedo itself, the defendant fully intended his ac-
cusation of another as the slayer to be exculpatory as to himself.
384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966).
The issue of the admissibility of a defendant's "exculpatory" statements con-
cededly was not before the Court. But the majority finding that the nature of
Tucker's "alibi" was not at issue, since it was not used against him, was an
unjustified avoidance of the issue of exclusion of evidence derived from what
was clearly an "exculpatory" statement in the Miranda sense.
10 417 U.S. at 437.
" People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
12 People v. Tucker, 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
13 Tuckerv. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/6
1975] TUCKER
peals.'4 The Supreme Court, in a stunning departure from both the
standards set forth in Miranda and the rationale of Wong Sun v. United
States,'5 reversed.
To facilitate its analysis, the Court found it necessary to divide the
question of the admissibility of Henderson's testimony into two main is-
sues: First, whether the police conduct actually violated the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or whether it "vio-
lated only the prophylactic rules developed [by the Court] to protect
that right";1 6 and second, whether the testimony must be excluded in
light of the violation involved.
The majority seemingly had little difficulty placing the Miranda warn-
ings outside the scope of constitutional protections afforded by the fifth
amendment. They reasoned that since Miranda was the first case to as-
sert that the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination re-
quired warnings in a police interrogation setting, the historical origins of
the privilege must be considered to determine exactly what the fifth
amendment commands. 17
Prior to Miranda, the test for admissibility of confessions obtained
from a defendant during police interrogation centered on the "voluntari-
ness" of the statements, based on the theory that an unreasonable or un-
fair interrogation procedure violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' It was not until Miranda that the fifth amendment
1' Tucker v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973).
15 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
11 417 U.S. at 439.
17 The Court preceded its discussion of the fifth amendment as applied to the police
interrogation setting with this kafkaesque observation:
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine its scope, and there-
fore we must continue to hark back to the historical origins of the privilege,
particularly the evils at which it was to strike.
417 U.S. at 439-40.
18 The test for admissibility of confessions remained static from the earliest cases until
the decision in Miranda and had been variously phrased by the Court: "In short, the
true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and with-
out compulsion or inducement of any kind." Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613,
623 (1896), and repeated in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897), and
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). "[Tlhe question in each case is
whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed." Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
The factors considered in the determination of voluntariness, however, expanded
with the Court's recognition that police tactics of interrogation were becoming far
more subtle than the beating of the defendant in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936). This perception culminated in the Miranda assertion that the "inherent
coercion" of police interrogation cannot be overcome without adequate warnings.
For a view of the numerous factors important to the issue of voluntariness see Haynes v.
Washington, supra (defendant held incommunicado for sixteen hours and told he could
not call his wife until he confessed); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (defen-
dant, a dull nineteen-year-old with a fifth grade education); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954) (tired defendant complained of sinus headache and police brought in a
psychiatrist who elicited statements which were recorded and then introduced at
trial); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (fifteen-year-old found incapable of making
voluntary statement without advice). See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55
(1951); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940). 3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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right against compulsory self-incrimination was made applicable to the
area of police interrogation. In Tucker, the majority found that the
Miranda decision itself recognized that the "procedural safeguards"
prescribed therein were never intended to be considered rights protected
by the fifth amendment. 19 Therefore, they reasoned, the failure to give
full Miranda warnings was not a per se violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights, and as a consequence, any application of the exclu-
sionary rule must be viewed in light of this "lesser" infringement upon
the rights of the accused.
The separation of the Miranda warnings from the protections guaran-
teed under the fifth amendment also precluded the application of Wong
Sun to the "fruits" of illegally obtained statements. Since Wong Sun in-
volved an actual infringement of the defendant's constitutionally pro-
tected rights,2 0 the Court found that case not to be controlling because
Tucker had already been determined to involve merely a departure from
the "prophylactic" rules of Miranda rather than a per se violation of the
defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Conse-
quently, the issue of exclusion of evidence derived from statements ob-
tained in the absence of full Miranda warnings was to be examined "as
a question of principle. '" 21
The Court set the stage for its inquiry into the purposes for the ex-
clusionary rule with an interesting insight into the philosophical under-
pinnings of the Tucker rationale:
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a per-
fect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that
policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatso-
ever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of
19 417 U.S. at 444, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), which denied
that the Constitution required "any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process." Therefore, the Tucker Court maintained that no
single element of the warnings, or for that matter, the warnings as a unit, is constitu-
tionally mandated.
0 In Wong Sun, federal agents broke into the home of Toy and arrested him. Toy in-
formed them that Yee had been selling drugs and the agents went to Yee's home.
Yee turned over some heroin to them, stating that he had gotten it from Toy and
Wong Sun, who was also arrested. Several days later, after being warned of his rights
to silence and to an attorney, Wong Sun confessed to selling narcotics.
The Court first found the entry on to the premises and the subsequent arrest of
Toy to be unlawful and that his statements were inadmissible as "fruits" of the un-
lawful acts. The Court further ruled the heroin seized at Yee's residence inadmissible;
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply be-
cause it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establish-
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence . . . has been come at by exploita-
tion of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint."
371 U.S. 471, 487, 488 (1963), quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
The confession of Wong Sun, however, was found admissible since the Court felt that
the connection between the arrest and the statement had "become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint." Id. at 491, quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
21 417 U.S. at 446.
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human nature would make such an expectation unrealistic.
Before we penalize police error, therefore, we. must consider
whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.2
The Court then found three general purposes underlying the exclu-
sionary rule in the fifth amendment context: first, deterrence of un-
lawful police conduct; second, protection of the courts from the introduc-
tion of untrustworthy evidence; and third, the requirement that the gov-
ernment must "shoulder the entire load" of producing evidence in a
criminal prosecution.2
3
Citing fourth amendment cases for the proposition that the exclusion-
ary rule is designed to "deter future unlawful police conduct"2 4 and is
"calculated to prevent not to repair,"' 25 the Court found it convenient
to attach this policy argument to the fifth amendment and found this
element lacking in Tucker since it viewed deterrence as applicable only
when the police have acted willfully, or at least negligently, thereby
depriving the defendant of his rights. Here, the Court found the police
had acted in good faith since they had asked the defendant if he wanted
an attorney and he had declined. Thus, they in no way violated the
principles of Escobedo v. Illinois,26 which was the controlling case at the
time.
The Court easily dispensed with the considerations of trustworthiness
and the requirement that the government produce evidence against the
defendant without any assistance from him. It found the latter propo-
sition subject to well recognized exceptions in the areas of search and
seizure, 27 and grand jury,28 in addition to voluntary statements accom-
panied by full Miranda warnings. Moreover, the majority questioned the
independent validity of this argument as a justification for the exclusion
of evidence. The problem of untrustworthy evidence was likewise not
applicable since Tucker was not coerced, in the pre-Miranda sense,
into making a statement and the testimony at issue was in fact that of a
third party not subject to custodial pressures.
Finally, in weighing the interests of society in the effective prosecu-
tion of criminals and the need for admission of all relevant and trust-
worthy evidence versus the protection of the constitutional rights of the
22 Id.
2 Id. at 446-49.
24 Id., quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
2 1d., quoting United States v. Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Little credence can
be given to this statement. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule finds, its vitality
in the need to both prevent future unlawful government conduct and to repair past in-
fringements on the constitutional rights of citizens.
26 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo stands for the proposition that an accused must be
allowed to consult with counsel when he so requests.
27 The Court cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which denied de-
fendant's claim that the blood test to which he was forced to submit violated his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination.
25 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), which held that a voice exemplar
compelled by the grand jury did not violate the fourth amendment since inter alia one
does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" vis-A-vis one's own voice.
1975]
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accused, the Court found that to exclude Henderson's testimony merely
because the police did not fully comply with the procedures prescribed
in Miranda would unjustifiably upset the "balance" of interests.
II. MIRANDA AS PROPHYLAXIS: THE EXTENT OF EXCLUSION
The circular analysis used by the Court to justify placing the Miranda
warnings outside the scope of constitutionally protected rights might be
phrased in this manner: In order to find that Miranda-type warnings are
rights incorporated into the fifth amendment, one must find such rights
alluded to in the cases pre-dating that decision; finding no mention of
warnings in the area of police interrogation, incorporation of the Miranda
protections is impossible. Although the Court's interpretation of the pre-
Miranda cases is quite accurate, it does not gainsay the necessity for
the approach utilized by the Court in Miranda. Indeed the metaphysi-
cal exercise of separating the warnings from the fifth amendment directly
contradicts that rationale in at least three ways. First, a primary contri-
bution of the Court in Miranda was the recognition that police interroga-
tion of any kind is "inherently coercive," 29 a factor that cannot be
overcome in the absence of warnings and an intelligent waiver. Thus,
the voluntariness test was abandoned in Miranda and replaced with a
"comprehensive and less subjective protection than the doctrine of pre-
vious cases." 0  Second, the incorporation of Miranda-type warnings into
the fifth amendment was essential to the holding in that case, as was
pointed out by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Tucker.31 Third, the
Miranda Court, while unwilling to set rigid guidelines vis-a-vis the warn-
ing procedure, clearly held that the 'suggested" warnings were mini-
mum standards which must be adhered to in the absence of an equiva-
lent.32
The minimum standards set by the Warren Court in Miranda are un-
29 The recognition of this fact appears throughout the Miranda opinion:
In these cases, we might not find the defendant's statements to have been in-
voluntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect
precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest
... To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patented
psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the of-
ficers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interroga-
tion to insure that the statements were truly a product of free choice.
384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). The conclusion compelled by this premise is obvious:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation ... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely.
Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
10 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 442-43 (1974).
31 The Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a con-
stitutional basis. We held the "requirement of warnings and waiver of rights
[to be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege," [384 U.S.]
at 476, and without so holding we would have been powerless to reverse Miran-
da's conviction.
Id. at 462-63 (first brackets in original).
32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). This language directly follows the
misleading quote used by Justice Rehnquist in Tucker. See note 19, supra.
[Vol. 24:689
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equivocal and not susceptible to the cavalier treatment accorded them
in the Tucker opinion unless one is willing to summarily preclude the
application of Miranda to the fruits of illegally obtained statements -
something the court did not ostensibly do.
The disingenuous removal of the Miranda warnings from the pur-
view of rights protected by the fifth amendment was used by the Court
not only to minimize the overall gravity of a violation of these constitu-
tional safeguards, but also to permit it to avoid any application of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as delineated in Wong Sun. A
careful analysis of this doctrine would have provided substantial argu-
ments favorable to the conclusion that the testimony of Henderson was
properly admitted; the Court, however, apparently wished to pursue a
pioneering course unfettered by any of the language or reasoning of the
"fruits of the poisonous tree" cases.31
Although a number of cases directly treat the issue of admissibility
of evidence derived from illegally obtained statements, the closely
analogous case of Smith and Bowden v. United States,3 4 decided shortly
after Wong Sun, provides an appropriate centerpiece for this discussion
since the majority opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
3, In addition to Wong Sun, several interpretations of the "fruits" doctrine have arisen
and are worthy of mention. One group of cases requires the prosecution to show that
the government had an "independent source" for the evidence sought to be sup-
pressed. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767
(D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964) (one of the few "easy" applications
of this rule, since F.B.I. files provided a substitute on retrial for defendant's illegally
obtained fingerprints); Commonwealth v. Nicholls, 207 Pa. Super. 410, 217 A.2d
768 (1966). The independent source test was also the basis of a dissent by Justice
Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist in United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), a wiretapping case.
In the context of Tucker, the record does not indicate whether the police investiga-
tion subsequently turned up any information concerning Tucker's association with the
witness Henderson. The prosecutor conceded that the police did not know of Hender-
son prior to their questioning of Tucker. The independent source concept, however,
does not require that the source exist prior to the police illegality. The source is ac-
ceptable even after the illegality if independently obtained and sufficiently substanti-
ated. See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968).
Another line of cases employs what has been termed the "inevitable discovery"
exception. Under this approach, evidence or information which in fact was obtained
as a result of unlawful conduct will nevertheless be admissible if the prosecutor can
show that it would have eventually been discovered. This test presents a very difficult
task for both the prosecutor, who must prove what might have been, and defense
counsel, who must rebut that contention with hypotheticals of his own. In Tucker,
the prosecutor might have had little difficulty proving that the police would have even-
tually contacted Henderson, since he was a friend of the suspect, but it is quite another
thing to prove that the witness would have given them the same information. Although
it is conceivable that Henderson would have divulged the same information to the police
since he was not an accomplice and had no reason to fear telling the truth, even in the
ideal situation such "proof" is difficult because one is dealing solely with hypotheticals.
See Leek v. Maryland, 353 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1965); People v. Chapman, 261 Cal. App.
2d 149, 67 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1968); Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969) (testimony of witness whose identity was learned by virtue of illegally obtained
statements of defendant admitted since police would have discovered the witness any-
way). Contra, United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
34 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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was authored by none other than present Chief Justice Warren Burger.
While the court in that case affirmed the suppression of defendant's
statements on the ground that they were illegally obtained 5 it consid-
ered the suppression of the testimony of an accomplice whose identity
was learned during the course of the interrogation to be quite another
matter. The court held that eyewitness testimony should generally not be
suppressed merely because of the circumstances through which the exis-
tence and identity of the witness were brought to the attention of the
police. It found a distinction between physical evidence when an object
is obtained as a result of an inadmissible confession, and testimonial
evidence when a witness is discovered through information obtained dur-
ing the course of an unlawful interrogation, since the mere disclosure of
the name of a witness by itself has no evidentiary value. Whereas an
inanimate object speaks for itself, the testimony of a witness involves the
element of free will which is normally sufficient to "purge the taint" of
the initial illegality.36 Substantial emphasis was placed on the fact that
the witness was at first reluctant to testify. In the court's estimation,
the subsequent change of mind sufficiently "attenuated" the initial illegal-
ity of the police conduct,3 7 thus making the testimony admissible.
The factors considered by the court in Smith and Bowden, if applied
to the facts in Tucker, would arguably support the admissibility of Hen-
derson's testimony. He was contacted initially to confirm Tucker's
alibi; he was not involved in the criminal act and hence might have
come forward on his own, since, unlike the witnesses in Smith and Bow-
den, he was not under the sort of pressure that would necessarily ac-
3 Defendants had been interrogated for several days before being brought before a
magistrate, a violation of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
requires that an arrestee be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
The McNabb-Mallory rule requires that a confession so obtained must be suppressed.
See, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
Oimith an d Bowden v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
3' The court further stated that to distinguish testimonial "fruits" from physical evi-
dence was not precluded by the holding in Wong Sun since that case involved the
introduction of a prior utterance and not the future testimony of an eyewitness. Id.
at 882 n.3.
The subsequent opinion of Smith and Anderson v. United States listed several fac-
tors to be considered in such a situation: that mere knowledge of the witness' identity
might not guarantee testimony favorable to the prosecution; the witness might have
eventually gone to the police anyway; and whether the witness' testimony had remained
unchanged from the start. 344 F.2d 545, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1965), citing McLindon v.
United States, 329 F.2d 238, 241 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Although the court found admissible the testimony of the two witnesses in this
particular case, their holding was based on the same rationale - "the purging of the pri-
mary taint." The witnesses in Smith and Anderson did not initially resist giving evi-
dence nor did they fear prosecution. The court found that the record did not indicate
that any of those involved "acted in such a significant manner as to break the chain
from the illegal source to the testimony introduced. The road from the [illegal source]
to the testimony may be long, but it is straight." 344 F.2d at 547, quoting in part
United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Brown v. United
States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967); Payne v.
United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
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company complicity in the crime. Yet any mention of this case is con-
spicuously absent.
Although the wisdom of the holdings in these cases is undoubtedly
subject to attack - especially for their misplaced emphasis on the "at-
tenuation" evidenced by the conduct and position of the witness, rather
than on an assessment of whether there was a direct, unattenuated causal
connection between the illegal act and the identification and subsequent
testimony of that witness3 - that is not the point. Whether one accepts
or rejects the analyses of these cases, they demonstrate that the lower
courts have invariably considered the application of Wong Sun funda-
mental to an analysis of the issues presented in the "tainted witness
'
"
39
situation as did the Michigan Court of Appeals 0 and the United States
district court4' in their Tucker opinions. Ironically, even the Supreme
Court of Arizona relied on Smith and Bowden to affirm the conviction
in the retrial of Ernest Miranda. 42
To concede that there is no controlling precedent with respect to a
particular issue before the Court does not imply that the case presents a
situation never before confronted in the history of American jurispru-
dence. By surgically removing the Miranda warnings from the penumbra
of constitutionally protected rights, the Court has also succeeded in eras-
ing the heretofore broad application of Wong Sun in but one sentence.
III. OF GOOD FAITH, DETERRENCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
It cannot be asserted that the police acted in bad faith in the Tucker
case, 43 nor can it be denied that the deterrent function is an important
consideration when justifying the exclusionary rules in both the fourth and
fifth amendment contexts. The Court, however, refused to recognize
that the exclusionary rule has been applied to all unlawful police con-
duct, whether it be done in good faith ignorance of the law as it existed
s For a criticism of the analysis of the opinions in Smith and Bowden and Smith and
Anderson see Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 32 (1967); Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant
Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Brown v. United
States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967); Edwards v.
United States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486
(2d Cir. 1962); People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 268 N.E.2d 778, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 911 (1971); People v. Peacock, 29 App. Div. 2d 762, 287 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500, 291 A.2d 106 (1972).
o People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
4' Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
42 State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
43 The assertion of good faith on the part of the police finds support in the record of this
case. The interrogation took place prior to Miranda, a fact which the Court termed
significant, and did not parallel the situation in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), where the officers had refused to allow defendant to confer with his attorney.
Tucker, the record noted, stated that he did not want an attorney, although it is unclear
in the absence of the warning with respect to appointed counsel whether Tucker's state-
ment meant that he waived his right to court appointed counsel or that he simply did not
want an attorney because he could not afford one.
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at the time of the act or as subsequently modified.4  The exclusionary
rule is not grounded upon the desire to punish malicious police conduct.
Rather, it is primarily intended to preserve the integrity of criminal pro-
ceedings by precluding the introduction of illegally obtained evidence,
regardless of the intent of the procurer.
45
The majority in Tucker refused to attach any independent significance
to the principle that the integrity of our judicial system ipso facto re-
quires exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence. Instead, they consid-
ered this principle to be merely an "assimilation" of the other rationales
discussed in the opinion. Although the exclusionary rule has been sub-
ject to criticism because it has heretofore been applied indiscriminately
to suppress evidence regardless of whether the police acted in good
faith, 46 such criticism is ill-founded since it is difficult indeed to prove
bad faith in a particular case. Thus, the Court in Tucker appears to
have worked important changes in the law without adequate considera-
tion of the ramifications attendant these alterations.
The deterrent value of excluding illegally obtained evidence becomes
even less significant when the case involves the issue of the "fruits" of
illegality. Once the primary illegality has been established, the sole is-
sue should be whether the evidence subsequently obtained is so closely
connected with the illegal act that it must be considered part and parcel
of the evidence that has already been found subject to suppression. If
good faith on the part of the police officers will permit the admission of
evidence obtained solely as a result of illegal conduct, why not admit the
evidence initially obtained in violation of the law. Any distinction is ex-
tremely artificial since the admission of the former is often more detri-
mental to the defendant than the latter as was evidenced by Tucker,
where the testimony of Henderson was considerably more damaging than
anything Tucker said to the police.
47
Moreover, some commentators have also distinguished the importance
of the deterrent function in the fifth amendment context in light of the
fundamental difference between the fourth and fifth amendment exclu-
4 The police knew as little about Miranda warnings when they questioned Ernest Mi-
randa as did the officers who questioned Thomas Tucker. Yet this did not prevent the
Warren Court from reversing Miranda's conviction on the basis of impermissible inter-
rogation procedures.
45 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
4 See Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in the fourth amendment case, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which he criticized the in-
discriminate suppression of illegally obtained evidence in the absence of bad faith on the
part of the police:
Inadvertent errors of judgment that do not work any grave injustice will in-
evitably occur under the pressure of police work. These honest mistakes have
been treated in the same way as deliberate and flagrant . . . violations . ...
Id. at 418.
4' The Court feebly argued in mitigation that the "damaging" statements themselves
were not used against Tucker:
Here respondent's own statement, which might have helped the prosecution
show respondent's guilty conscience at trial, had already been excised from the
prosecution's case . . ..
417 U.S. at 451.
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sionary rules.4 8  The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a court-cre-
ated means of discouraging violations of the prohibition against "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures," whereas the fifth amendment has a
self-contained exclusionary rule, making it less susceptible to exception
absent a sound constitutional basis.4 9 The deterrent rationale is itself a
court-created justification for the exclusionary rule of the fourth amend-
ment; the fifth amendment rule needs no such justification; to compare
the two in the same manner as did the Tucker Court is highly inac-
curate.5 0
Nevertheless, it seems irrelevant whether the deterrent rationale or a
stronger fifth amendment argument is applied5' since the Miranda-type
confrontation is "tailor-made for a sequential 'try it legally - if you fail
try it illegally' approach, 5 2 making the deterrent function of the ex-
clusionary rule all the more necessary. In the typical search situation,
the police must at the outset make an unalterable decision whether to
conduct a search under questionable circumstances, a decision which
will forever determine the admissibility of the seized evidence and of-
ten the "fruits" of that intrusion. On the other hand, in the typical
interrogation setting, the police can give the warnings in full or in part,
48 See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
49 Id. at 1214-15.
50 See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), in which defendant took the
stand in his first trial after three confessions were admitted into evidence. After his
conviction was reversed on appeal, upon a finding that the confessions were illegally ob-
tained, the prosecution on retrial offered into evidence damaging statements made by
defendant at the first trial. Harrison was again convicted, but the Supreme Court re-
versed finding the former testimony inadmissible as "fruits" of the illegally obtained
confession since it was precipitated by the need to rebut the inadmissible confessions.
The Court specifically stated, however, that this decision was confined to the issue of
the use of defendant's own prior statements and no analysis of the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine was undertaken. Id. at 223 n.9.
A comment on Justice White's dissent in Harrison, however, criticized his reliance
on the issue of deterrence in the determination of admissibility:
Therefore, Mr. Justice White seems mistaken in requiring a showing that the
exclusion of Harrison's testimony will deter the police from obtaining future
confessions in impermissible circumstances. The crucial issue in the fifth
amendment context of Harrison is, rather, whether there exists a chain of coer-
cion running from the original compelled admissions to subsequent testimony
by the defendant such that the admission of this testimony would violate the
defendant's right against coerced self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 222 (1968).
s Although the opinions of the commentators are certainly not unanimous on this point,
the deterrent value of excluding evidence obtained as a result of illegal interrogation
should not be minimized:
[I]t is clear that if the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained con-
fessions for links and leads rather than being required to gather evidence inde-
pendently, then the Miranda warnings would be of no value in protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination. The requirement of a warning would be
meaningless, for the police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what
they could not accomplish directly, and there would exist no incentive to warn.
Pitler, supra note 33, at 620.
For a commentary questioning the wisdom of extending the exclusionary rule this
far for violation of "merely" the Miranda procedures, see H. FRFENDLY, BENCHMARKS
279 (1967).
52 Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 48, at 1220 n.90.
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and if the defendant requests counsel or is unwilling to talk, the officers
might choose to continue the questioning in the hope of obtaining leads
to witnesses, as in Tucker, or of eliciting statements which might later
be useful should the defendant take the stand at trial, as was the case in
Harris v. New York.5A While Tucker seemingly does not sanction such
continued questioning, the tests of "good faith" and "deterrent value" are
flexible enough to allow it because their application depends almost ex-
clusively upon a judge's pre-conceived, highly subjective notions of police
motivations .54
An additional factor which militates against placing decisive emphasis
on the deterrent value of excluding derivative evidence may be found in
the Miranda decision itself. Implicit in the warnings requirement is the
necessity that the defendant know his rights. 55 The fact that the police
officer acted in good faith in no way aids an accused in ascertaining
those rights and hence should not be controlling. Yet the Court com-
pletely ignored this factor in Tucker. In fact, Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion even refused to affirmatively accept the deterrent value in excluding
Tucker's own statements to the police, blithely noting that:
[W]hatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclu-
sion of those statements may have had, we do not believe it
would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of
the witness Henderson as well. 56
The overstated significance attached by the Court to the trustworthi-
ness issue is misplaced in its analysis of the exclusionary rules, especially
in the context of the admissibility of Henderson's testimony. When the
admission of physical evidence is at issue, there is no problem of trust-
worthiness; in the coerced statement situation, the viability of this consid-
- 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
-4 But see Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966). Defendant was given full Miranda warnings and he exercised
his right to silence. Several hours later another police officer, after again giving full
warnings, attempted to question defendant regarding an "unrelated" matter. The Court
upheld the admission of statements made during the second interrogation finding that
Miranda did not create a .per se rule with regard to resumption of questioning after a
defendant had indicated a desire to remain silent. Rather, the test for admissibility is
whether defendant's right to cut off questioning had been "scrupulously honored." The
Court found that this right was honored since the police did not refuse to discontinue
the initial interrogation nor did they make repeated efforts to "wear down his resistance
and make him change his mind." Id. at 327.
55 The Court analysis in Miranda is at least two-dimensional. First, warnings are neces-
sary to combat the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation. Second,
since knowledge of one's fifth amendment rights is essential for an intelligent and
voluntary waiver, the warnings provide objective criteria for determining whether or
not a proper waiver has been obtained. The Court noted that
[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on informa-
tion as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
384 U.S. at 468-69.
56 417 U.S. at 448. For an insight as to how at least one member of the Court views the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rules in general see Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).
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eration was dismissed even before Miranda was decided.57  In Tucker,
the Court ignored this fact and then seemingly equated trustworthiness
with voluntariness. After repeating that Tucker's statements had already
been found "voluntary" and therefore trustworthy, the Court noted that
Henderson's testimony was even more credible since he was not sub-
jected to any custodial pressure. Thus, initially the Court wrongly ap-
plied the trustworthiness rationale to Tucker's own statements and then,
carrying an already tainted argument to its absurd extreme, applied the
same rationale to the testimony of a witness whose trustworthiness and
voluntariness were never in dispute.
The ease with which the Court dispensed with the issues presented
in Tucker is epitomized by their final justification for the result. In a
textbook example of the misapplication of a misleading statement, the
Court quoted Harris:
[S]ome comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read
as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Mi-
randa barred the prosecution from making its case with state-
ments of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effec-
tively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that
evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's
case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that
the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.58
Notwithstanding the statement's erroneous suggestion that Miranda is
subject to several possible interpretations on this issue, which it is notP 9
the statement itself supports only the proposition that Miranda does not
command that evidence excluded in the prosecution's case in chief be
excluded for all purposes.6 0  In Tucker, the evidence "derived" from the
57 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Although this case was decided on
due process grounds, Justice Frankfurter's opinion made it clear that trustworthiness is
irrelevant to a determination of voluntariness.
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascer-
tained extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of
excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this consideration.
Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause
has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions
obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left
little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such
verification, confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally im-
permissible methods in their inducement. Since a defendant had been sub-
jected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should
not be subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to his
conviction had failed to afford him that due process of law which the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees.
Id. at 541.
5 417 U.S. at 451, quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
5 Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 48, at 1209.
9o This critical point was noted by the district court in Tucker v. Johnson:
Thus, whatever inroads have been made on the collateral uses of Miranda, it
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defendant's statement was used in the prosecution's case in chief. To
analogize these quite dissimilar situations simply by saying that they
"believe that this reasoning is equally applicable here"6' hardly substi-
tutes for telling us why it is applicable.
6 2
IV. A RETURN To VOLUNTARINESS?
Ironically, the Burger Court has created its own exclusionary rule
for the "fruits" of statements obtained with less than full Miranda warn-
ings, if the premise that Miranda itself did not decide that issue is ac-
cepted. In "balancing" the interests of society in the effective prose-
cution of criminals and the need for admission of all relevant and trust-
worthy evidence versus the protection of constitutional rights, the former
will no doubt prevail since the Court maintains that the Miranda warn-
ings are not constitutionally mandated and are therefore not inviolable.
Unfortunately, the product of this analysis is a rule which will never
warrant exclusion solely on the basis of defective warnings. In the face
of defective warnings, if the facts of a particular case exhibit lack of
is nevertheless clear from Harris that what the prosecution does on its case in
chief will still be carefully scrutinized.
352 F. Supp. 266, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
61 417 U.S. at 452.
62 The cursory treatment of the subtle issues presented in Tucker is unfortunately not
the first time the Court has disposed of grave questions of fifth amendment viola-
tions with less than sound analysis. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the
Court relied on Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), in holding that illegally
obtained statements of the defendant may be used to impeach his testimony, while
completely ignoring what should have been the controlling case, Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The differences between the situation in Walder and
that in Harris were crucial. First, Walder was a fourth amendment case allowing im-
peachment of defendant's testimony by use of physical evidence secured illegally,
whereas in Harris the illegally elicited statements of the defendant presented a signif-
icant problem of trustworthiness. Second, and more importantly, Walder's testimony
was impeached on a collateral matter. He stated at trial that he had never seen heroin
before and the prosecutor confronted him with the fact that officers had illegally seized
some heroin in his possession several years before. In Harris, the impeachment evi-
dence went directly to the guilt of the defendant since it related to certain "exculpa-
tory" statements made by Harris at the time of his arrest for the particular crime at is-
sue. How did Chief Justice Burger resolve the critical distinctions? "We are not per-
suaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that
reached by the court in Walder." 401 U.S. at 225.
Moreover, in Tucker, the contrived and easily refuted "issues" of trustworthiness
and of the government's burden to discover evidence without compelling the assistance
of the defendant, closely parallel the superficiality of a large part of the Court's
"analysis" in Harris. First, the majority opined that Harris' right to testify in his own
defense did not imply a right to commit perjury. Therefore, prior inconsistent state-
ments must be admissible to preclude that possibility. Not only is this a statement that
no one would dispute, but more importantly it unjustifiably presumes that defendant's
out of court, illegally obtained statements to the police are true and that his trial testi-
mony is likely to be perjurious. A second justification offered by the Court in Harris
for admission on cross examination of illegally obtained statements is that the state-
ments would be admissible if they had been made to a third person. This fatuous
argument is so obviously irrelevant that it merits no further comment.
The misplaced emphasis on irrelevant issues both in Tucker and in Harris does not
lend itself to sound judicial resolution of any important constitutional question and
more importantly makes the Court's sincerity subject to grave doubt. See Dershowitz
& Ely, supra note 48.
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good faith by the police,63 the statements obtained will more likely
than not be "coerced" in the pre-Miranda sense, hence the evidence
derived therefrom will be excluded. On the other hand, if good faith
is shown, the rule as formulated by the Court will allow the statement
to be construed as voluntary and the evidence derived therefrom to be
admitted. Thus, the Court has succeeded in formulating an exclusionary
rule which completely vitiates the Miranda rationale.
The remaining question that must be asked is whether the Tucker opin-
ion may be interpreted as the first step in the Court's plan to reinstitute
the "totality of the circumstances - voluntariness" test as the criterion
for admissibility of a defendant's own statements.6 4  True, in Tucker,
the Court emphasized the requirement that "statements taken in violation
of the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's
case at trial"; 65 yet the criteria considered by the majority in their de-
termination of the admissibility of derivative evidence, coupled with the
strained argument utilized to separate the warnings from the Constitu-
tion, indicate that Tucker is at least intended to give notice of a relaxation
of the heretofore strict Miranda mandate. Whereas Harris v. New
York66 and Oregon v. Haas67 did much to undermine Miranda as ap-
plied in the cross-examination context, neither case presented an over-
view of the Court's philosophy toward the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule as did Tucker. In view of these cases, the possibility of a return
to the pre-Miranda test should not be discounted.68  At the very least,
Tucker presents the probability that a number of lower courts will
"misinterpret" the opinion as permitting the application of the volun-
tariness test to the admissibility of a defendant's own statements.69
61 The Court gave no guidance with regard to the practical application of the "good
faith" test. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
614 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
61 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974).
66 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
- 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
6' It appears that the majority considered Tucker applicable to the admissibility of a
defendant's own statements. This is the only plausible explanation for the Court's re-
mand of Pennsylvania v. Romberger, 417 U.S. 964 (1974), remanding 454 Pa. 279,
312 A.2d 353 (1973). In Romberger, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had reversed
appellant's conviction on the ground that statements made by the defendant to the police
should not have been admitted because they were not preceded by the Miranda warn-
ings. Although the interrogation took place before Miranda, the trial commenced sub-
sequent to that decision and the Court correctly held that Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966) required exclusion of those statements (Johnson gives retroactive ef-
fect to the Miranda decision in just such a situation). The Court nonetheless vacated
judgment and remanded the case for consideration in light of Tucker with no mention
of Johnson. The Court has sub silentio overruled the Johnson decision and with it any
retroactive effect of Miranda that may have survived Tucker. See also State v. State-
wright, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974), an interesting case which interpreted Tucker as
giving retroactive application to violations of constitutional rights only, thus finding
Miranda inapplicable in the same situation as Johnson and Romberger.
6 This has already occurred in several cases decided since Tucker. In United States v.
Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975), the court of appeals found that the F.B.I. bad
fully complied with the Miranda requirements. Defendant's additional contention that
the district court had erroneously applied the "totality of the circumstances" test of
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) was also rejected. This statute was a congressional attempt to 15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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V. CONCLUSION
No one would assert that the often unprecedented opinions of the
Warren Era are worthy of unquestioned obedience. The mores and phi-
losophy of the society in which we live sometimes seem to change with
the seasons, and the Burger Court opinions are as much a reflection of
that rapid change as were its predecessors' frequent breaks with the
"past." Unquestionably, the Burger Court decisions with respect to
fifth amendment rights have molded radical changes in a law which
many had grown to accept as sacrosanct. But the demise of the Warren
perspective toward the safeguards afforded by the fifth amendment
should not be the primary focus of its elegy. What should be lamented
is the Court's seeming reluctance to replace the old rules with some-
thing more than glib truisms and vague generalities which present no
lucid guidance either to law enforcement officials or to the courts which
must now attempt to apply them to the specifics of a criminal prosecu-
tion.
JEFFERY P. REINHARD
reverse Miranda and reinstitute the voluntariness test, providing specific factors to be
considered in the determination - the presence of Miranda warnings included. 18
U.S.C. § 3501(b). The statute specifically provides, however, that "[t]he presence or
absence of any . . . factors . . . need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntari-
ness. . .. ." Id.
The court, noting that the Supreme Court in Tucker found it significant that de-
fendant's own statements were not introduced at trial, nevertheless misconstrued the
application of the "fruits" doctrine in that decision:
[T]he Court recognized that Henderson's trial testimony had a devastating
effect inasmuch as it completely contradicted Tucker's alibi defense, i.e., that at
the time of the rape he was away from the scene in the company of Hender-
son, and further implicated Tucker by reason of remarks allegedly made to
Henderson by Tucker directly related to the crime. We observe that if each of
the Miranda warnings are constitutionally mandated under any and all circum-
stances, certainly the Court would have been hard pressed in permitting the
admission of Henderson's testimony under the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine.
510 F.2d at 1138.
Several other lower courts have utilized the Tucker tests of good faith and volun-
tariness to support the introduction of defendant's own statements taken without full
compliance with Miranda. In Cranford v. Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975),
the court found a good faith effort on the part of the police to comply with Miranda
although they had failed to inform the defendant that counsel would be provided if re-
quested'. In this case, counsel was not immediately available and the court noted that
this fact does not compel the police to cease all questioning.
Although neither of these cases rely exclusively on Tucker to support the admissi-
bility of these statements, they are indicative that lower courts are finding the broad
generalities of Tucker highly useful to justify admissibility in extremely sensitive
situations. Thus, the Court has indirectly encouraged the rebirth of the vague lan-
guage and analysis of the voluntariness test, seasoned to taste with Miranda and "good
faith." See also Tilson v. Rose, 392 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); State v. Hudson,
325 A.2d 56 (Me. 1974). For a discussion of section 3501 see Gandara, Admissibility
of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation, of Section 3501 By Law En-
forcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 306-07 (1974).
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